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COMMERCIAL LAW
KARL JOHNSON*
A picture held us captive.,
The utopian and semantic seductiveness of "Freedom of Contract" has
long captivated the legal imagination. The phrase evokes a picture of
moral clarity, of a simpler (and romanticized?) time when folks decided
what they wanted from each other, struck a bargain and, if they were so
inclined, wrote it down so there would be no mistake later about the
commitments they had made. This private lawmaking-the bilateral cre-
ation of a set of rules to govern interpersonal relations-epitomized the
sort of conduct which the public law ought to leave alone. When the
bargain went sour and one of the parties sought the power of the state to
implement the private rules, a court could display the maximum sensitivity
to individual autonomy, and thereby cut the widest swath for personal
freedom, by simply enforcing what the contractors had freely agreed to
do.
But the least sophisticated consumer on the street can instruct the most
distinguished jurist that this picture and its accompanying conceptual
baggage has in daily life absolutely nothing to do with reality. "Freedom
of Contract" is nonsense and an utter fiction for one whose pervasive
experience with contracting amounts to signing standardized forms which
are neither read nor meant to be; which even if read are nothing but
mysterious incantations to the uninitiated; and which even if understood
render the effort to understand a cruel and futile exercise, for the terms
they contain are fixed and unalterable. When contracting consists of
signing a standardized form, the process is not experienced as an incident
of freedom but, instead, of tyranny: domination by the drafter, oppression
and powerlessness by the nondrafter of the form "agreement." The bi-
lateral, democratic private lawmaking envisioned in the myth of "Free-
dom of Contract" has been displaced by the unilateral imposition of rules
of conduct upon one who has had no voice in their legislation.
None of these observations are new, of course,2 and in fact the rapid
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 115 (3d ed. 1967).
2. See, e.g., Dugan, Good Faith and the Enforceability of Standardized Terms, 22 Wn. & Mary
L. Rev. 1 (1980); Dugan, Standardized Forms: Unconscionabilitv and Good Faith, 14 New Eng.
711 (1979); Dugan, Standardized Form Contracts-An Introduction, 24 Wayne L. Rev. 1307 (1978);
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growth of the law of products liability in tort evidences the dissatisfaction
felt by courts and litigants with the inadequacy of traditional contract law
to cope with standardized consumer contracts. But they deserve repetition
when "Freedom of Contract" is solemnly and reflexively invoked to
justify the enforcement of standardized forms when what really should
be at issue is not freedom, but the lack of it.
This article will focus on three decisions of the New Mexico Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court's reversal of one of them, implicating
the doctrine of "Freedom of Contract" and demonstrating the need for
deeper reflection upon its role in the enforcement of standardized con-
tracts. The remainder of the article will examine a selection of other
decisions by the New Mexico courts in the area of commercial and
business law. All of the cases were decided during the Survey year, April
1981 through March 1982.
I. CONTRACTS
A. Freedom of Contract
In Lynch v. Santa Fe National Bank,3 plaintiffs purchased real estate
under contracts placed in escrow with the defendant bank. When the bank
improvidently released the escrowed documents to the seller and the
Lynches sued for damages, the bank admitted its negligence but denied
liability because of an exculpatory provision in the escrow agreements.
The trial court enforced the exculpatory clause, which provided that the
bank was not liable for any acts or omissions done in good faith nor for
any damages except those caused by its willful or gross negligence, and
dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed.
The court began with the premise, supported by prior New Mexico
cases, that exculpatory clauses are valid and will be enforced unless the
agreement falls within certain limited exceptions to the rule. The most
widely recognized exception voids the clauses in contracts calling for the
performance of a public duty. Utilities and common carriers, for example,
may not by contract escape the consequences of their own negligence. 4
The traditional scope of the exception has been expanded to encompass
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev.
629 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Kessler]; Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control
of Lawmaking, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Slawson].
3. __ N.M __ , 627 P.2d 1247 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied _ N.M __, P.2d _ (1981).
Because of a printing error, Lynch does not appear in the New Mexico Reports at this time. For
further discussion of the case, see Minzner, Property, post at 435, and Note, Contracts-Exculpatory
Provisions-A Bank's Liability for Ordinary Negligence: Lynch v. Santa Fe National Bank, 12 N.M.
L. Rev. 821 (1982).
4. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 (1981); Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa
Growers' Ass'n, 67 N.M. 108, 353 P.2d 62 (1960).
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contracts "where a public interest is involved," 5 most notably in the
landlord/tenant relationship and in the field of banking.6
The Lynches first argued that because the defendant is a bank, its
contracts with members of the public necessarily involve the public in-
terest and that exclusionary clauses contained within them are thus invalid.
The court's curious response was the following argument. The New
Mexico "public interest" exception contemplates only that "[a] party
'cannot contract against its negligence in the regular course of its busi-
ness . . . ,' " that is, the exception covers only "banking functions."
Further, plaintiffs failed to prove that the bank's escrow service is a
banking function: "Although defendant is a bank, that fact alone does
not make defendant's escrow service either a banking function or a public
service. "I Therefore, the court concluded, the defendant's identity as a
bank was irrelevant in determining the existence of a public interest.
The response is curious in three ways. First, it is a mighty elevation
of form over substance to require proof that banks provide escrow. Judicial
notice alone of the appellate cases in which banks have appeared in their
role as escrow agents is more than enough to support that proposition.
Second, even if proof is required, it is only of "the regular course of its
[the defendant's] business" 9 and not of enterprise-wide practice. And the
court had before it uncontradicted evidence that the contract involved in
this case was a standardized form, prepared by the bank's attorney, and
repeatedly used without variation for the individual customer!'0 Third, at
least part of the public service that banks perform is to provide a secure
institution to safeguard entrusted valuables. A bank that claims its public
service stopped short of protecting entrusted real estate documents would
surely shock its customers and should have shocked the court. It didn't,
but the Lynches weren't through.
They next argued that even if the nature of the provider (the bank)
failed to bring the contract within the public interest, the nature of the
service (escrow) did. To bolster their argument they had a California case
which reached exactly the result they desired. In Akin v. Business Title
Corp.," the court held invalid an exculpatory clause in an escrow com-
pany's contract because escrow involves the public interest. Akin em-
ployed the analysis developed some years earlier in Tunkl v. Regents of
5. Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 1960); Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Artesia Alfalfa Growers' Ass'n, 67 N.M. at 118, 353 P.2d at 69.
6. A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 559(1) (Kaufman Supp. 1982).
7. - N.M. at -, 627 P.2d at 1252 (quoting dictum from Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Artesia Alfalfa Growers' Ass'n, 67 N.M. at 118, 353 P.2d at 69).
8.. N.M. at , 627 P.2d at 1252.
9. Id. at -, 627 P.2d at 1252 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at __, 627 P.2d at 1249.
11. 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968).
Spring 1983]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
University of California, 2 in which the court invalidated a similar clause
in a hospital's patient agreement. The two cases utilized a set of six
characteristics, the presence of some or all of which invokes the public
interest and thus invalidates an exculpatory clause. The six are, somewhat
roughly, whether the party seeking exculpation (1) engages in a business
generally thought suitable for public regulation, (2) performs a service
of great importance to the public, (3) performs the service for the public
generally, (4) possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength over
members of the public, (5) uses a standard contract of adhesion, and (6)
has control of the purchaser's property or person, subject to the risk of
the seller's negligence.
Although Akin found all six characteristics present in an escrow trans-
action, both that court and the Tunkl court clearly viewed the character-
istics not as necessary conditions but as factors not all of which need to
be present to justify a finding that the contract involved the public in-
terest. 13 Nevertheless, the court of appeals in Lynch found two of the
characteristics missing and declined to follow Akin. The court first argued
that New Mexico, unlike California, has left the escrow business largely
unregulated; in this state, then, the business is not generally thought
suitable for public regulation and the first Tunkl characteristic was missing.
Once again the court had to strain both reality and logic to justify its
holding. Escrow is widely enough regulated in a number of states to
support the proposition that it is "generally thought suitable for public
regulation" even though New Mexico does not in fact regulate it exten-
sively. Further, while actual regulation may indicate that regulation is
"generally thought suitable," the absence of regulation may have a variety
of explanations and may not only be due to general perceptions about
suitability for regulation. "Although escrow is generally thought suitable
for public regulation, New Mexico has left it unregulated," is a perfectly
consistent statement, but the court's argument here must call it a contra-
diction.
The court said that the Lynches also failed to prove the presence of
the fourth characteristic, that the bank's bargaining strength was superior
to their own. This surely came as a surprise to the plaintiffs, who had
submitted "uncontradicted" evidence that:
the exculpatory clause is part of a standard printed form, prepared
and approved for use by defendant's attorney; that defendant does
not negotiate with a party seeking to utilize defendant as an escrow
agent, rather, defendant presents the form to the party for filling in
12. 60 Cal.2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
13. Id. at -, 383 P.2d at 445, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37; Akin v. Bus. Title Corp., 264 Cal. App.
2d at __, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
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the blanks and for signature; that a party cannot have the exculpatory
clause removed by payment of an additional fee. . . . [D]efendant's
form is presented to a party on a "take it or leave it" basis. 14
That is not enough, said the court, without further proof that the Lynches
could not "leave it." If there were other escrow agents who offered the
service without the offending clause, the Lynches had an alternative to
agreement with the bank; they could take their business elsewhere. The
court paid scant attention to how the plaintiffs should have proved the
absence of alternatives, but appeared to suggest that they must have shown
an actual diligent but unsuccessful search for alternative terms, or that
the search would have been futile because they would have found no
alternatives in the market.
The thesis that absence of alternatives is a necessary element in proof
of bargaining advantage did double duty for the court. It not only defeated
plaintiffs' attempt to bring their case within the "public interest" exception
but also doomed their alternative argument that disparity of bargaining
strength alone is sufficient to invalidate an exculpatory clause.' 5 In Tyler
v. Dowell, Inc.,'6 the Tenth Circuit's statement of New Mexico law
suggested this second exception to the "general rule" that exculpatory
clauses are enforceable:
[E]xculpatory clauses in contracts of this kind are not favorites of
the law. They are strictly construed against the promisee and will
not be enforced if the promisee enjoys a bargaining power superior
to the promisor, as where the promisor is required to deal with the
promisee on his for her] own terms. . . . Nor will a contract be
enforced if it has the effect of exempting a party from negligence in
the performance of a public duty, or where a public interest is in-
volved. 17
The Lynch court assumed that Tyler's statement of the law was correct,
but voiced its reservation that the factual predicates were really indepen-
dent. Superior bargaining power, the Lynch court speculated, may not be
in itself a reason to invalidate an exculpatory clause in a contract, but
instead may be just one factor in deciding whether the clause should not
be enforced because of a public interest. But once the court altogether
rejected plaintiffs' attempt to prove superior bargaining power, it was
unnecessary for the court to determine the effect of the advantage alone,
absent an involvement with the public interest.
The court arrived at the "absence of alternatives" thesis by parsing the
14. - N.M. at _, 627 P.2d at 1249.
15. Id. at __, 627 P.2d at 1250.
16. 274 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1960).
17. Id. at 895.
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Tyler language in a rather intriguing way. Superior bargaining power,
said the Tyler court, is present "as where the promisor is required to deal
with the promisee on his [or her] own terms."18 The Lynch court inter-
preted this to mean that the bargaining advantage is present only where
the promisor is required to deal with the promisee. So, the court con-
cluded: "Plaintiffs were required to deal with defendant on defendant's
own terms if plaintiffs were to obtain defendant's services, but that is
not the meaning of 'required to deal.' 'Required to deal' involves the
absence of alternatives ... .
There are two purely logical problems with this argument. First, as-
suming Tyler is a correct statement of the law, the Lynch court illicitly
transformed an instance or example of a rule ("as where") into a necessary
condition, or sole instance, of the rule ("only where"). Second, the Tyler
formulation is crucially ambiguous, and may be read to support either
the bank or the Lynches. The profit and peril of the passive voice ("is
required to deal") is that the writer may get away without identifying the
actor. Who requires that the promisor deal on the promisee's own terms?
It may be the market's lack of alternatives, as the court assumed, or it
may be the promisee whose terms are a condition of doing business; if
the latter, then the Lynches were indeed required to deal on the bank's
terms. But it is impossible to choose, as the court attempted to do, between
the two glosses on the basis of the meaning of "required."
Akin never explicitly mentioned the presence or absence of alternatives
to exculpatory escrow, nor did that court ever reveal the measure of the
plaintiff's proof on the matter. The Lynch court, however, inferred that,
"[t]he references in Akin to a 'standardized contract of adhesion' and the
'practical necessity' of members of the public agreeing to the exculpatory
clause suggests [sic] an absence of an alternative." 2 Akin, however,
simply cannot sustain that interpretation. The first reference in Akin is
footnoted to a commentator's explanation of "contract of adhesion" which
focuses not upon the option to walk away but upon the manner in which
the contract is formed: the absence "of the give and take of bargaining
where the desires of one party are balanced to those of the other." 2 The
second reference does not even concern bargaining advantage but is part
of the discussion of escrow as an important public service, the first
characteristic of the Tunkl analysis.22 Further, it imports no more than the
practical unavoidability of some members of the public using a given
agent and is silent upon the variety, or lack of it, in escrow contracts.
18. Id.
19. - N.M. at -_, 627 P.2d at 1250.
20. Id.
21. 264 Cal. App. 2d at __ n. 4, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 290 n. 4.
22. Id. at __ 70 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90.
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That's the argument. With the exception of a parting salvo, which I
reveal shortly, the court had little else to submit in its defense of the
exculpatory clause. This detailed but I hope not overly belabored, ex-
amination is intended to show one thing and ask another: (1) the court
had a terrible (and unsuccessful) time trying to find decent arguments to
support its position; (2) why?
The position that the existence of alternatives equalizes bargaining
power and consequently validates standardized contracts is not without
its attractiveness. Friedrich Kessler's seminal essay23 that provided the
theoretical foundation for the use of "unfair bargaining power" to avoid
the more onerous obligations of standard form contracts emphasized trans-
actions in which the drafter occupied a monopoly position. The customer
could not "leave" the contract with the objectionable clause because there
were no competitors or because all competitors used a similar clause.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,24 which opened the way for judicial
review of the fairness of adhesion contracts, invalidated a warranty dis-
claimer in an industry-wide contract. And as the Lynch court pointed out,
Tunkl alludes to the significance of alternatives, noting that the patient
in the admission room of a hospital is not in an ideal situation to do
comparison shopping.25
Certainly the absence of alternatives in the market is reassuring to a
court that wishes to avoid the harshness of a particular clause, for it can
do so and remain well within the mainstream of traditional jurisprudence.
All that is required is the observation that duress can be economic as well
as physical or emotional. Lack of choice is coercive, particularly if the
goods or services sought are essential, and removes a necessary condition
to judicial enforcement-that the contract be freely entered. Conversely,
the presence of choice eliminates the coercion because it provides the
customer with bargaining power: her realistic option to walk away may
either be exercised or used to lever concessions from the seller.
The presence or absence of alternatives is relevant, however, only
within that traditional construct which I have called the "picture" of
"Freedom of Contract." So the remainder of Lynch comes as no surprise.
Enforcement of the exculpatory clause, the court said, is ultimately a
policy decision. The policy of allocating the risk of negligence which
motivated the courts in Akin and Tunkl, however, avoids the "basic issue"
which
involves the policy of freedom of contract and is concerned with
23. Kessler, supra note 2.
24. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
25. - N.M. at -. , 627 P.2d at 1250 (quoting Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at -, 383 P.2d at 447, 32
Cal. Rptr. at 39.
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when that freedom is to be restricted. . . . General Electric Credit
Corporation v. Tidenberg, 78 N.M. 59, 428 P.2d 33, 40 A.L.R. 3d
1151 (1967) states: "[Plublic policy encourages freedom between
competent parties of the right to contract, and requires the enforce-
ment of contracts, unless they clearly contravene some positive law
or rule of public morals. "26
The picture in Lynch, then, is this: the plaintiffs apparently could have
successfully avoided the exculpatory clause if during the transaction they
had comported with the court's view of "proper" contracting behavior.
The Lynches should have (1) read the standard form, front and back, (2)
noticed the exculpatory clause, (3) understood or consulted their lawyer
about its significance, and either (4) negotiated the bank out of the term,
or (5) diligently (but without success) searched for alternative escrow
without the clause. That this picture is utterly removed from reality, in
all but the most extraordinary situations in which a person is confronted
with a standard form contract, hardly bears saying.
Nobody but lawyers on a case and a few social deviants even looks at
the back side of a standardized form, much less tries to bargain about
what appears there. For one thing, detailed attention to every standard
form contract we sign or receive-from tickets to receipts to credit slips
to contracts for insurance-would raise prohibitively the transaction costs
to the customer of most of these exchanges. We just do not have the time
or inclination to digest all the legal jargon, much less the money to hire
a lawyer to do it for us. For another, understanding the form is fruitless,
even if we were odd enough to take the time to do it; the other party
simply is not going to bargain with us about what we discover on the
flipside of the form, and the employee with whom we deal no doubt does
not even have the authority to do so if she wished. If we want the product
or service we grit our teeth, sign the form, and just hope that the 'stuff
on the back doesn't come back to haunt us. This is not, of course, what
I tell my clients to do. I tell them to read everything before they sign it.
But I don't, and I know from experience that they don't either. And why
should they? In fact, empirical evidence has suggested what the demise
of the mirror-image rule27 has reflected: even more sophisticated business
people, armed with their own attorneys and standard forms, pay almost
no attention to what is contained in those forms and allow them to exert
little influence over their business relationships.2
8
26. __ N.M. at -. , 627 P.2d at 1253.
27. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1978) (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-207 (1978)); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §61 (1981).
28. McCaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Stud ,, 28 Am. Soc. Rev.
55 (1963) [hereinafter cited as McCaulay], reprinted in D. Black, The Social Organization of Law
75 (1973).
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Of course, when the relationship ends and litigation begins, the form
becomes all-important. But why should that be? One reason why it should
not be is that using the form to resolve the dispute consistently favors
the litigant who drafted the form over the nondrafter, and all too often
results in the unearned redistribution of wealth from the consumer to the
enterprise. A second reason why it should not be is that dominance of
the form diverts the attention of the parties in negotiation of a contract
dispute, and of the court in its resolution of it, from what should be the
focus: a fair and just settlement of the problem. The form has nothing to
do with this issue, however, and this is the third reason. There is no
moral or legal reason why the one who writes the fine print ought to be
advantaged with the power to dictate the behavior of the other. The essence
of contract has always been mutual assent, but it is only the captivation
of the picture of "Freedom of Contract" which lends even an air of
plausibility to the proposition that one who signs a standard form contract
assents to the multitude of unread and unbargained-for terms contained
in the form.
If the picture falsifies the reality of typical modern contracting, the
invocation of "Freedom of Contract" has value implications vastly at
odds with the lofty ideal the phrase imports. No one's freedom is enhanced
by allowing one party to write the rules of the game and present them
as a fait accompli to the other. The law enforces domination, not liber-
ation, when it allows the bank at the time of litigation to avoid the effects
of its own negligence simply because, unbeknownst to the Lynches, it
planted a bomb on the reverse side of the standard form.
But the influence of the picture is so strong. Take, for instance, Boss
Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill,29 also decided in the court of appeals during
the Survey year but later reversed by the supreme court. At issue was a
clause in a commercial lease prohibiting sublease without the lessor's
consent. Unable to obtain the necessary consent, plaintiffs successfully
sought in the trial court a ruling that the clause required the lessor to
consent to a commercially reasonable sublessee. The court of appeals,
however, reversed the trial court's determination that the lease clause
contained an implied condition that consent to sublease could not be
unreasonably or arbitrarily withheld. The lease clause, the court of appeals
held, "gives the lessor an unqualified right to withhold such consent." 3"
The clause merely required the lessor's consent to sublease; conditions
of the consent were neither specified nor denied. New Mexico law was
equally silent, but other states presented a choice between a "majority
29. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1042 (Ct. App. July 9, 1981), rev'd, 97 N.M. 239, 638 P.2d 1084
(1982).
30. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 1044.
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position . . . that the lessor can withhold consent without justification
when the lease requires his [or her] written consent. ." and "[t]he
contrary position . . . that . . . such consent cannot be withheld unrea-
sonably or arbitrarily." 32 Opting for the former, the court of appeals
"decline[d] to rewrite"33 the questionable clause. Stylistically it certainly
could have used it: the clause consists of one sentence which occupies
an entire column of the state bar bulletin!
34
As the court of appeals' words suggest, the picture is that the parties
have written the contract, freely undertaking obligations that the law,
given the dictates of freedom, may only enforce. Thus, the court argued
that the absence of any qualification to the "sublease consent" provision
implies that the parties could not reasonably be expected to read into the
clause an additional requirement of justifiable refusal. If the parties had
desired that qualification, the court declared, they could have written it
into the contract. The court added, as if perfectly consistent with these
two arguments: "The lease in question is a form lease used extensively
throughout the state. The large number of parties to these form leases
should be able to rely on the plain language of their leases." 3"
The emphasis on the numbers suggests that the court's concern is with
the certainty of legal rules. Although the thesis that the certainty estab-
lished by the rule of law permits rational planning and hence capitalist
development is philosophically venerable, it remains empirically doubt-
ful.36 Even if it could be established, however, that certainty in contractual
terms is an independent value worth pursuing, our democratic system
should not permit purchase of certainty at the expense of proper rule-
making procedure. So here lies the contradiction between the court of
appeals' three arguments: standard form contracting, the factual premise
of the certainty argument, eliminates the necessary factual premise of the
first two arguments, the picture of contracting as bilateral, consensual
private rulemaking, the product of mutual assent negotiated in give-and-
take bargaining. For it is hardly relevant how the parties could reasonably
be expected to interpret language one or both could not reasonably be
expected even to have read. Nor is how the lessee might have drafted
the clause a meaningful inquiry when she in fact did not and, moreover,
lacked any power to alter what was already written there.
The court's picture, of course, could have been representative. The
lessee, contemplating sublease, might have read or had a lawyer go over
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1045.
34. Id. at 1043.
35. Id. at 1044.
36. McCaulay, supra note 28.
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the lease, picked out the offending clause and negotiated for its removal.
We don't know whether this sort of thing happened, because the court
tells us absolutely nothing about the transactional setting. The missing
information is vital, for without some facts such as these, the use of
"Freedom of Contract" to enforce standardized terms is worse than ir-
relevant; it legitimates oppression and domination.
What, then, ought to be done with all the fine print? Read it carefully,
at least when a restraint on alienation is involved, answered the supreme
court, reversing the court of appeals.37 Although the supreme court's
opinion begins to point the direction of the solution, it ends by super-
imposing the same familiar picture of contract over the ignored social
realities. The supreme court tendered two justifications for its conclusion
that the sublease consent provision demanded reasonable behavior from
the lessor. First, said the court, the lease is "governed by general contract
principles of good faith and commercial reasonableness. .... New Mexico
law has consistently required fairness, justice and right dealing in all
commercial practices and transactions. . . . [W]e construe [the clause]
to require that the landlord act reasonably when withholding his [or her]
consent to a sublease agreement." 3" Second, the identical construction is
dictated by the axiom that "[reasonable restraints upon the alienation of
property are to be strictly construed so as to operate within their exact
limits." 39 Because the lease did not specifically permit the lessor to with-
hold consent arbitrarily, "in the absence of more specific language" ' ' that
right cannot be implied.
What is implied by appending the "good faith, commercial reason-
ableness, fairness, justice and right dealing standard" to the second ra-
tionale is that the standard may be implemented simply by more careful
drafting. Surely two parties could explicitly agree that the lessor should
have an absolute right of refusal. "Good faith et al." must then demand
only that they say so, and the lessor's solution becomes the interpolation
of one more clause into the column-long lease provision. The supreme
court thus fully shares the fundamental assumptions about contracting
procedure which guided the court of appeals, that the parties should be
free to strike their own bargain and, moreover, that a standardized form
adequately represents the bargain's terms. For both courts, parties who
have freely agreed have defined "fairness" for their transaction. Ajudicial
decision about what's fair is necessary only when the parties haven't
agreed, only when the form is silent. It is solely upon this factual inter-
37. Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 638 P.2d 1084 (1982). This case is also discussed
in this issue in Minzner, Property, post at 435.
38. 97 N.M. at 241, 638 P.2d at 1086.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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pretation that the two courts differ: whether an unqualified right of refusal
speaks or is silent upon the subject of qualifications. But in this view the
"fairness" standard is nothing more than a trap for the unwary drafter,
and the protection evaporates precisely at the point when it is needed
most-in the presence of the comprehensive, carefully prepared standard
form contract.
The court of appeals itself suggested a better solution in the third of
these cases, Stock v. ADCO General Corp.4 Plaintiff Stock had solicited
bids for physical damage insurance on his tractor-trailer fleet, selecting
a proposal submitted by Pierce Agency. Pierce obtained the insurance
from Stuyvesant Insurance Company through ADCO, who was both Pierce's
broker and Stuyvesant's general agent. When the policy arrived in the
mail, predictably neither Stock nor anyone at Pierce read it and so no
one noticed that the policy covered only certain "named drivers" and
that one of Stock's drivers had been left off the list. Just as predictably,
the omitted driver had a wreck. Stuyvesant refused to pay, and Stock
sued Pierce, Stuyvesant, and ADCO. The principles of "Freedom of
Contract" notwithstanding, the court of appeals upheld judgment against
all three defendants.
Stock admitted that he received the policy, that its language was clear
and unambiguous, and that he had an opportunity to examine it for a
reasonable time. That constituted acceptance of the terms of the policy,
the insurer argued, and if the court of appeals' rationale in Lynch and
Boss Barbara provided any guidance, we should have expected the court
to agree. It did not. The exclusion of the unnamed driver, the court held
was unenforceable because Stock "did not reasonably expect ' 42 the policy
to contain the named driver provision. That his expectations would have
evaporated upon an informed reading of the policy did not detain the
court; Stock was under no duty "to read the policy word for word." '43 In
fact, he didn't read a single word, but "simply placed the unopened policy
in his office file."" Nonetheless, Stock was entitled to the satisfaction
of his reasonable expectations regardless of what the fine print said.
"Freedom of Contract" receives nary a mention in the opinion. Indeed,
the court of appeals even upheld the trial court's determination that Stuy-
vesant's reliance on the clear language of the policy and consequent
refusal to pay the claim after Pierce and Stock had made their expectations
known was so "unreasonable and unconscionable" 45 that Stuyvesant should
41. 96 N.M. 544, 632 P.2d 1182 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 543, 632 P.2d 1181
(1981).
42. 96 N.M. at 546, 632 P.2d at 1184.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 545, 632 P.2d at 1183.
45. Id. at 548, 632 P.2d at 1186.
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pay Stock's attorney fees.46 The court finally suggested that Stuyvesant's
behavior was, moreover, sufficiently "inequitable" to invoke the rule that
a unilateral mistake accompanied by fraud or other inequitable conduct
by the other party justifies contract reformation .4
The yawning chasm in both direction and tone between the court of
appeals' opinions in Stock and Lynch/Boss Barbara has a number of
potential explanations, none of which adequately distinguish the two
positions. Among them was the assistance in Stock of a close state supreme
court precedent, Pribble v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,48 requiring an insurer
to pay for an occupational injury clearly excluded by the policy. The
insurer's agents had mistakenly assured plaintiff that the policy covered
the injury. Upon the strength of those assurances, plaintiff undertook an
extended treatment program for which the insurer then refused to pay,
asserting that the insured had an obligation to read the policy. Refusing
to "mechanically charge" the plaintiff with the duty to read and understand
the insurance contract, the supreme court held instead that the insured
was
only bound to make such examination of such documents as would
be reasonable for him [or her] to do under the circumstances; that
he [or she] will only be held to that which he [or she] would be
thereby alerted; and if the language is such that a layman would not
understand its full impact were he [or she] to attempt to plow through
it, the documents will yield the maximum protection consistent with
their language and the reasonable expectation of [the insured]. 49
Despite the suggestion of the last clause, the court held that the injury
was covered, thus enforcing a "reasonable expectation" of the insured
which was completely inconsistent with the contract language.
While the existence of the close precedent may have made the Stock
court's task easier, that psychological supposition hardly explains why
Pribble should not have equally relieved the plaintiffs in Lynch and Boss
Barbara from the burdens of reading, understanding, and negotiating
about their standardized contract terms. Insurance contracts are indeed
enveloped in a specialized body of law replete with canons of construction
which to a degree protect the insured from overreaching by the drafter.
Insurance contracts are also among the lengthiest of standardized forms,
although whether they are also among the more indecipherable I would
hate to speculate. But to view Pribble and Stock as insurance cases and
for that reason inapplicable outside a narrow enterprise is wholly arbitrary.
46. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-1 (1978), provides that an insurer who acts unreasonably in failing
to pay a claim may be assessed the prevailing insured's attorney fees.
47. 96 N.M. at 549, 632 P.2d at 1187.
48. 84 N.M. 211, 501 P.2d 255 (1972).
49. Id. at 216, 501 P.2d at 260.
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If the law recognizes the obvious fact that policy holders neither read nor
understand their "contracts," and makes the corresponding value judg-
ment that neither should they be expected to do so, why not recognize
the same equally obvious fact (and make the same equally realistic value
judgment) across the range of standard form contracting?
The active though innocent misrepresentation in Pribble-the policy
didn't say what the agent said it said-is certainly absent in Lynch and
Boss Barbara, but this second potential device for distinguishing the two
positions endangers the reliance Stock placed in Pribble's precedent.
There was no active misrepresentation in Stock. Perhaps sensitive to this
difference, thecourt portrayed the defendant's failure to call the named
driver provision to Stock's attention as an omission to reveal terms so
salient that the nondisclosure was at least close enough to Pribble's
misrepresentation. The role of the "misrepresentation" in both cases is
to create, or at least to allow, reasonable expectations which the court
will enforce even if it means ignoring contract language. In Pribble, this
result is not particularly surprising; that a party who misrepresents the
terms of a written contract is bound to the representations made, on the
theory that the negligent failure to read the contract is a lesser evil than
the misrepresentation of its terms, might even be designated a "general
rule. ""
Stock carries Pribble into new territory, however, where Lynch and
Boss Barbara are found. For if one party has a duty to bring to the notice
of the other any terms of a standardized contract which would defeat the
other's reasonable expectations, the bank in Lynch and the lessor in Boss
Barbara failed to fulfill that obligation. The most basic principles of tort
law teach us that we have a right to expect from others both due care
(Lynch) and behavior appropriate for the "reasonable person" (Boss Bar-
bara). Form clauses which permit escape from those standards defeat the
reasonable expectations of the party against whom they are imposed, and
so under Stock ought not to be enforced.
A third possible but unsuccessful way of distinguishing Stock lies in
the case's peculiar facts. First, a contract of insurance is normally pre-
ceded by a quotation to the potential insured and an application submitted
to the agent. Neither the quotation nor application in Stock, the court
pointed out, contained any mention of the named driver provision; its
inclusion in the policy was therefore not "what the insured reasonably
expected from the quotation"'" and application, and that variance was
fatal to the clause's enforceability. Second, the named driver provision
50. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20(2)(a) (1981); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of
Contracts § 9-43 (2d ed. 1977).
51. 96 N.M. at 545, 632 P.2d at 1183.
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is truly extraordinary in insurance policies. Pierce had never seen such
an endorsement in 27 years in the insurance business,52 and Stuyvesant
had even "furnished ADCO with a supply of special red stickers to be
attached to the face page of the policy, which warned of the endorsement
and its limited coverage." 53 ADCO, unfortunately, failed to attach the
sticker to Stock's policy.
While precontracting behavior for insurance may be more formalized
than in some other areas in which standard form contracts are used, the
procedure is essentially the same. Agreement in principle is reached upon
the basic terms of the transaction, followed by the presentation for sig-
natures of the form document which purportedly memorializes the agree-
ment. But the pre-standard form understandings, whether written or oral,
contain only a smattering of what finally appears in the "contract." The
parties simply do not discuss the vast majority of standard clauses, so
their interaction before the standard form intervenes can rarely be a source
of expectations about what the form contains. Rather, in insurance or any
other field, the interaction can normally at most leave reasonable expec-
tations untouched. A host of provisions were included in Stock's policy
that were absent from the quotation and application, but that fact alone
does not mean that Stock could have reasonably expected none of them
and thus have invalidated the entire written policy. The expectations were
created by what law, morality, experience, and common sense instruct
we have a right to expect from others; the quotation and application in
Stock, just as the bank's and lessor's silence in Lynch and Boss Barbara,
merely failed to dispel the expectations.
The extraordinary nature of the suspect clause in Stock is likewise at
most a difference in degree and not kind. That the provision deviated
from usual insurance policies was important to the court because Stock
"thought he would receive a physical damage insurance contract like
those he had received previously from other agents and other compa-
nies."154 Past experience is certainly one legitimate indicator of what
expectations are reasonable, but that analysis is independent of how un-
usual the clause is. Even if the named driver provision were more common
throughout the industry, and even if it had appeared in Stock's prior
policies, there is no reason to assume he should have been aware of the
limitation unless it had caused him trouble before. In fact, according to
the court, he didn't even have an obligation to notice the clause, unusual
or not, unless it was part of the pre-standard form understanding. Sim-
ilarly, the plaintiffs in Lynch would hardly have been less shocked by the
revelation that the bank to whom they had entrusted important papers
52. Id. at 548, 632 P.2d at 1186.
53. Id. at 545, 632 P.2d at 1183.
54. Id. at 546, 632 P.2d at 1184.
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had no obligation to take care of them had they then discovered that
exculpatory clauses in escrow are common. An unusual provision may
strengthen the conclusion that the clause is outside the party's experience,
thus allowing for reasonable expectations otherwise. But those expecta-
tions may not be dispelled by even a common provision which remains
unexperienced.
In my view, then, Stock is not only correct but also directly applicable
to Lynch and Boss Barbara and its application there would have changed
the outcome of those two cases in the court of appeals. If we free ourselves
from the picture, "Freedom of Contract" cannot supply a plausible basis
for the enforcement of unilaterally created rules of behavior. Private
lawmaking through contract is democratically justifiable only in the pres-
ence of mutual assent, the traditional hallmark of contract law whose
factual basis has been eroded by the standard form "agreement." The
real "contract," then, consists initially only of those terms to which the
parties have actually manifested knowing assent: the "bargained-for ex-
change." Other rules supplied by the drafter of the standard form become
part of the contract only if their correspondence with the reasonable
expectations of the other party can be proved.55
If the clause which the other party would not reasonably expect is really
central to the drafter's willingness to undertake the obligation, she may
always dispel the other's expectations by bringing it to the latter's in-
formed notice, thus making the clause part of those provisions to which
there is mutual assent. Only when the drafter has been forced to sell the
weakness as well as the strength of what is offered does the customer
have notice of the importance of shopping for different terms. 56 Should
no alternatives be available in the market, of course, the customer's assent
to the original terms offered may still be impugned under the rubric of
good faith and unconscionability 57 or, as Lynch suggests, because of
superior bargaining power. But this is a second stage of judicial analysis
of the transaction. The first should be the determination of what terms
are actually part of the bargain, which requires an examination less of
the fine print than of the reasonable expectations of the party who didn't
get a chance to draft it.
The "practical effect" of the holding of Stock, the court of appeals
concluded, "will be to encourage warnings of some kind when an insured
is issued a policy different from that which he reasonably expects .... "58
That is a result which justice and fairness commend to all fields of contract
law.
55. See Slawson, supra note 2.
56. Id.
57. u.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-302 (1978) (N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 55-1-203, 55-2-302 (1978)); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts §§ 205, 208 (1981).
58. 96 N.M. at 547, 632 P.2d at 1185.
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B. Formation
Two cases during the Survey year concerned interesting problems of
contract formation: offer and acceptance in Corr v. Braasch,5 9 and con-
sideration in Church v. Church. 6 In Corr, the failure of real estate sellers
and a broker to agree on the broker's commission prevented the formation
of a contract between the buyer and sellers, even though the buyer and
sellers had reached agreement on the terms of the sale itself. The buyer
sent an offer to purchase through the broker who, unbeknownst to the
buyer, added a clause to the purchase agreement requiring the sellers to
pay the broker a six percent commission. When the sellers received the
offer, they changed some of its terms, and in particular changed the
commission from six percent to $5,000, a reduction of $6,500. The buyer
later initialed the other modifications, but neither buyer nor broker ini-
tialed the reduction in commission. When the sellers decided not to go
through with the sale, the buyer sued.
The trial court enforced the purchase agreement as modified, finding
that the broker had accepted the $5,000 commission figure. The supreme
court reversed that finding for lack of substantial evidence, and then faced
the problem of what to do with the remainder of the contract, given that
no agreement had been reached between the sellers and broker. The trial
court had concluded as a matter of law that the purchase agreement was
two separate contracts: one between the buyer and sellers, the other
between the sellers and broker. The supreme court appeared to believe
that under the trial court's ruling, failure of the second contract would
not affect the validity of the first, so it also reversed that part of the
ruling:
To hold that [the sellers] are bound by the sales portion of the agree-
ment yet are not bound by the commission provision would be to
selectively enforce the terms of the clause inserted by [the broker]
and would introduce precedent for subdividing any contract with
multiple terms despite the written manifestation of the parties.61
Despite these words, the supreme court's determination of this issue
depended not at all on the "written manifestations." Instead, it was based
on the sellers' oral testimony that because the down payment offered was
lower than they wanted, they would not sell the property at all with the
six percent commission.
The supreme court concluded from this evidence that the two promises
were crucially related for the sellers: they were willing to deal upon the
terms offered by the potential buyer only if the broker agreed to reduce
the commission. Agreement on the second promise was thus a condition
59. 97 N.M. 279, 639 P.2d 566 (1981).
60. 96 N.M. 388, 630 P.2d 1243 (Ct. App. 1981).
61. 97 N.M. at 281, 639 P.2d at 568.
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for the sellers' willingness to undertake the first. Consequently, the court
held that the sellers' alteration of the commission kept their response from
being an acceptance of any part of the proferred purchase agreement; it
was, instead, a counteroffer which was never accepted by the buyer or
broker. No acceptance, no contract, no sale.
The issue of how many contracts were involved is unfortunately some-
thing of a red herring and invites a misreading of the case. The sellers
were asked for two promises, one to the broker and one to the buyer.
Separate contracts or not, all that matters is the relationship between the
two promises, namely whether the second was conditional upon agree-
ment to the first. The trial court could ignore that issue because it found
that there was in fact agreement to the first, although its conclusion of
law that the two were "separate" contracts suggests that it might have
felt they were also independent. The issue, however, as the supreme
court's handling of it reveals, is not one of law; the case thus may not
be cited for the proposition that multiple promises in a single transaction
are part of one contract and must stand or fall together. Rather, the case
turns on the unremarkable principle that as a factual matter, a party may
make agreement on one matter a precondition to agreement on another.
When that happens and the first part of the deal falls through, so con-
sequently does the second.
The court of appeals decided the second formation case, Church,62
using Virginia law but it is instructive for the light it sheds upon similar
causes of action under New Mexico law. The plaintiff had worked to put
her husband through four years of medical school, but from the second
year onward, the future Dr. Church carried on an extramarital relationship.
Upon graduation, the new Dr. Church immediately filed for divorce. His
wife responded with a suit for fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of
an oral contract. The wife's claim alleged that in return for a one-half
interest in her husband's increased earning power after medical school,
she agreed to and did provide: (1) emotional support and services as a
housewife, (2) financial support for living expenses, and (3) the cost of
his medical education. The court of appeals held that under Virginia law,
the plaintiff had a duty to provide the services of a wife and that element
could therefore provide neither consideration for the contract nor a basis
for recovery in fraud or unjust enrichment. However, the court held that
the plaintiff had no duty to provide either living or educational expenses
and so reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to
state a claim.
The opinion suggests, accurately it appears, that New Mexico law
would recognize only the third item as sufficient consideration to support
62. 96 N.M. 388, 630 P.2d 1243 (Ct. App. 1981).
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the contract. In New Mexico, a spouse has a legal duty not only to render
the familial services of a wife63 or husband' but also to provide financial
support for the other.65 Because Virginia law contains no corresponding
obligation of financial support, the court did not have to decide whether
the cost of the doctor's education is "support" money. In this state,
however, if that cost were deemed part of "support," its use as consid-
eration would be barred by the same mutual duty that prevents ordinary
living expenses from constituting consideration. Conveniently, the opin-
ion supplies dictum to point the direction for New Mexico law:
"[Tlraditionally, the funds provided by a wife to pay for her husband's
medical education would be considered an item separate from funds
provided for his support." 66
Church thus suggests that New Mexico would recognize an enforceable
contract for a wife's earning her" 'Ph.T.' (putting hubby through school)," 67
with consideration supplied by the wife's provision of educational ex-
penses. The usefulness of the action in New Mexico, however, is limited
by our community property law: the educational contribution must come
not from her own earnings, community property which the student-hus-
band would already have full power to manage and dispose of,68 but from
her separate property.
C. Remedies
The buyer's two goods-oriented remedies under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, rejection and revocation of acceptance, received the at-
tention of the New Mexico court in two cases during the Survey year,
Celebrity, Inc. v. Kemper69 and O'Shea v. Hatch.7"
In a straightforward application of the Code's provisions, Celebrity
outlined the procedure which the buyer should have followed, but didn't,
to reject an entire shipment of goods because of defects in some of them.
Plaintiff Celebrity had sold goods for several years to Kemper, a retailer.
Although Celebrity's invoice provided for all returns to be made within
five days and with its prior written authorization, the practice had been
for the salesperson on her next call to inspect any defective items and
make an adjustment to the account. This time, however, the salesperson
refused to make an adjustment when notified of the defective items.
Kemper did nothing further until, three months later, he received a demand
63. Tellez v. Tellez, 51 N.M. 416, 186 P.2d 390 (1947).
64. Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980).
65. 96 N.M. at 392, 630 P.2d at 1247 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-2-1 (1978)).
66. 96 N.M. at 396, 630 P.2d at 1251 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 391, 630 P.2d at 1246.
68. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-3-14 (1978).
69. 96 N.M. 508, 632 P.2d 743 (1981).
70. 97 N.M. 409, 640 P.2d 515 (Ct. App. 1982).
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for payment and the threat of a lawsuit from Celebrity. When Kemper
boxed up all of the unsold goods, whether defective or not, and returned
them, Celebrity acted on its threat. The trial court found that Kemper
had effectively rejected the entire shipment and had no obligation to
Celebrity for the purchase price. The supreme court reversed, holding
that Kemper had effectively rejected only the defective goods and thus
remained liable for the purchase price of the remainder.
Kemper clearly could have rejected the entire shipment, the court
pointed out, because of the defects in some of the goods: where the
seller's tender fails in any respect, the buyer may reject the whole, accept
the whole, or accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest. 71
Further, his rejection of the defective goods was effective upon notification
to the salesperson, despite the provision of the invoice stipulating an
exclusive manner of rejection. Kemper was entitled to rely on their course
of dealing, the court reasoned, until the refusal to make adjustments put
him on notice that Celebrity invoked the express terms of the contract.
At this point, however, he had only attempted to reject the nonconforming
goods. His further attempt at rejection, the reshipment three months later
of the conforming goods, failed because "as a matter of law" 7 2 it was
not "within a reasonable time after their delivery. ", 73 The failure to make
an effective rejection constituted acceptance,74 the court concluded, and
gave the seller the right to recover the purchase price 75 for the conforming
goods.
Additionally, the court noted, Kemper's attempted rejection of the
remainder of the shipment failed to specify the particular defects prompt-
ing the return, which the Code requires when the seller either requests it
or when she could have cured the defects had they been specified. 76 There
are two flaws in this secondary rationale. First, there was no indication
that either of the conditions requiring particularization of defects was met.
Second, the court had held that the rejection of the defective goods was
effective. If particularization were necessary, the requirement was pre-
sumably satisfied by calling the defects to the salesperson's attention;
when the conforming goods were returned, there were no further defects
left to specify. If the court wanted an alternative ground for its decision,
it had a better one available than the absence of particular notice. Kemper
not only failed to make an effective rejection; his acts of pricing the goods
and putting them up for sale (and even selling some of them which his
71. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-601 (1978).
72. 96 N.M. at 509, 632 P.2d at 744.
73. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-602(1) (1978).
74. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-606(1)(b) (1978).
75. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-709(1)(a) (1978).
76. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-605(1) (1978).
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customers later returned!) were "inconsistent with the seller's ownership"77
and thus independently constituted acceptance.78
The supreme court's willingness to find the buyer's three-month silence
unreasonable as a matter of law contrasts interestingly with its own de-
cision a year earlier in Ybarra v. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc.79 and with
the court of appeals decision in O'Shea8" this Survey year. In both, the
courts declined to set limits as a matter of law for similar determinations
under the Code and preferred to leave the finding of reasonableness a
matter for the trier of fact. Like the buyer who rejects goods, a buyer
who accepts but, upon failure of the seller to cure as promised or upon
discovery of a previously hidden defect, now wishes to revoke the ac-
ceptance, must also act within "a reasonable time after the buyer discovers
or should have discovered the ground for it . . . ," In Ybarra, however,
the supreme court refused to hold that four years was, as a matter of law,
an unreasonable time within which to revoke acceptance of a mobile
home. Unlike the silent Kemper, the buyer in Ybarra had during the four
years repeatedly complained to the seller, who in turn had repeatedly but
unsuccessfully attempted to fix the defect. Nevertheless, Ybarra's stance
is that reasonableness under the Code is a factual matter. That suggests
that the issue of "reasonable time" for notice of rejection should be
reviewed for substantial evidence rather than, as in Celebrity, as a matter
of law.
O'Shea indicates that the court of appeals shares that inclination. The
defendants, the Hatches, sold the O'Sheas a colt in response to their
request for a horse with a gentle disposition suitable for both show and
riding by children. Although, represented as a gelding, the horse was
not: it had an undescended testicle. Acting like a stallion, the horse was
unsuitable for either of the purposes for which the O'Sheas purchased it.
When the O'Sheas discovered the problem some three nionths after the
sale, they demanded their money back. The Hatches refused but offered
to pay for removal of the other testicle, which was done but to no avail.
The horse still didn't act like a gelding. The court reported no further
contact between the parties for the next three and one-half years, during
which time the O'Sheas continued to ride and show the horse. They then
filed suit for damages, arguing that they had rightfully revoked their
acceptance of the horse. The trial court agreed and so did the court of
appeals.
Whether the revocation was effective was doubly important. First, if
77. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-606(1)(c) (1978).
78. Id.
79. 94 N.M. 249, 609 P.2d 331 (1980).
80. 97 N.M. 409, 640 P.2d 515 (Ct. App. 1982).
81. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-608(2) (1978).
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the plaintiffs had reaccepted the horse after the operation, they failed
from that point forward to give notice to the seller of any breach; failure
to notify of breach within a reasonable time of discovery bars the buyers
from any remedy.82 Second, even if the buyers could overcome the first
hurdle by relying on the pre-operation notice, their damages for breach
of warranty would have been less than for rightful revocation. 83 The issue
centered on the effect of the buyers' use of the horse after they told the
sellers they wished to return it and get their money back. When the buyers
had the operation on the horse and continued to ride and show it, the
sellers argued, they lost their right to revocation and reaccepted the horse
by acts "inconsistent with the seller's ownership." 4 The court rejected
the argument and held that the plaintiffs' post-revocation behavior, did
not, as a matter of law, render the revocation ineffective.
The legal effect of the operation did not detain the court, nor should
it have. The court noted that the sellers not only consented, they suggested
it to cure the defect, and so the buyers exercised no "dominion or own-
ership of the horse ' 85 when they procured the operation. The effect of
riding and showing the horse for three and one-half years after revocation
is more troublesome. The court began its argument with the clearly correct
proposition that, "[w]here a buyer notifies a seller of revocation of ac-
ceptance of goods, and receives no instructions from the seller concerning
the return or disposition of the property, the buyer is entitled to retain
possession of such property." 86 Although the court did not provide the
statutory support for that assertion, the Code contains it. A revoking buyer
"has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if
he [or she] had rejected them."87
In the absence of any instructions from the seller, the rejecting (and
therefore revoking) buyer "may store the rejected goods for the seller's
account or reship them to him [or her] or resell them for the seller's
account .... -88 In addition, a buyer in possession of goods who rightfully
rejects or revokes acceptance has a security interest in the goods for any
payments made on their price and for expenses incurred in handling them,
and may "hold such goods and resell them"' 89 to satisfy the security
interest. Although the court only mentioned in passing that the buyer
without a security interest has an obligation after rejection to hold the
goods with reasonable care for a time sufficient to permit the seller to
82. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-607(3)(a) (1978).
83. Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-714 with § 55-2-711(1) (1978).
84. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-606(1)(c) (1978).
85. 97 N.M. at 414, 640 P.2d at 520.
86. Id. at 416, 640 P.2d at 522.
87. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-608(3) (1978).
88. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-604 (1978).
89. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-711(3) (1978).
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remove them," the O'Sheas' payment of the purchase price clearly gave
them a security interest in the horse.
So the court was correct that the revoking buyer may retain possession
of the goods, but the statutory rights to store, reship, or resell hardly
justify their continued use. The court could have made use of the Official
Comment's suggestion that, "The listing of what the buyer may do in
the absence of instructions from the seller is intended to be not exhaustive
but merely illustrative."'" Even so, the illustration contains not a hint
that a buyer may continue to use the goods as her own for three and a
half years after revocation. Nevertheless, the court continued:
[Wjhether a buyer accepts goods by subsequent acts inconsistent
with the seller's ownership is a question of fact to be determined
from the evidence in each particular case....
Continued possession and reasonable use of property after the buyer
has notified seller of revocation of acceptance, under the U.C.C.
does not as a matter of law constitute waiver of the right to revoke
acceptance. 92
Again the court mentioned no statutory mandate either for the assertion
that reasonable use after revocation is permitted or for the assertion that
it is a matter of fact, not law, whether such use constitutes acceptance
because it is inconsistent with the seller's ownership.
The court cited a number of cases, however, which support both prop-
ositions, but under considerably different factual circumstances.93 In all
but one of the cases, the continued use of goods after revocation lasted
at most a couple of months, rather than years;94 in the other, the duration
of use is unclear, but may have been almost two years.95 Second, and
more importantly, in each of the cases the court suggested that the con-
tinued use was in fact reasonable, either because (1) the failure to use
would have had such serious repercussions upon the buyer's business that
continued use mitigated damages, 96 or (2) continued use, namely contin-
90. 97 N.M. at 614, 640 P.2d at 522.
91. U.C.C. § 2-604, official comment (1978).
92. 97 N.M. at 415-16, 640 P.2d at 521-22.
93. Mobile Home Sales Management, Inc. v. Brown, 115 Ariz. 11, 562 P.2d 1378 (Ct. App.
1977); Minsel v. El Rancho Mobile Home Center, Inc., 32 Mich. App. 10, 188 N.W.2d 9 (1971);
Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., Inc., 304 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1981); Fablok Mills,
Inc. v. Cocker Machine and Foundry Co., 125 N.J. Super. 251, 310 A.2d 491 (App. Div. 1973).
94. Mobile Home Sales Management, Inc. v. Brown; Minsel v. El Rancho Mobile Home Center,
Inc.; Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., Inc.
95. Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Machine and Foundry Co.
96. See Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., and Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Machine
and Foundry Co.
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ued occupation of a mobile home, was the best way to safeguard the
property pending the seller's instructions. 97
It is difficult to imagine that over three years of riding and showing a
horse which the buyer claimed was suitable for neither was an appropriate
way to mitigate damages or to safeguard the property. Although the record
was silent on these matters, the court nevertheless held that the finding
that the revocation was effective was supported by substantial evidence
because the sellers failed "to show how any delay may have prejudiced
them, or to show that the delay could have been avoided." 98 Because the
sellers caused the delay by their failure to contact the buyers to arrange
for removal of the property, it doesn't make much sense to allow them
to avoid the effects of the delay by proving either that it was prejudical
or avoidable. But if "use" is substituted for "delay" in the court's for-
mulation (the sellers failed to show how any use may have prejudiced
them, or to show that the use could have been avoided), it reflects the
factors which influenced the courts whose opinions are used for support
here: the continued use is prejudicial and avoidable if it is unsuitable to
mitigate damages or to safeguard the property.
O'Shea, then, amounts to an allocation of the burden of proof. Once
the buyer has proved revocation of acceptance, her continued use of the
goods in the absence of the seller's instructions will not negate the re-
vocation and constitute a reacceptance of them unless the seller can prove
that the use was "unreasonable"-either prejudicial to the seller or rea-
sonably avoidable. This result makes revocation of acceptance a truly
powerful remedy for the buyer, who often is in the predicament of pos-
sessing neither satisfactory goods nor the money to purchase a substitute,
because she has already paid the seller. When the seller refuses the
revocation, the buyer has the unhappy options of reselling, returning or
storing the goods and doing without (often at great inconvenience and
detriment), or of continuing to use the defective goods until the frustration
becomes so great that she resorts to a lawsuit. Thus, for instance, when
a buyer trades in her old car for a new lemon but can't afford to return
it and sue for rescission, to require her to do so is a hardship contrary to
the "rule of reasonableness" which underlies the entire Code. 99 Equally
reasonable is that the party claiming waiver, as at common law, be re-
quired to bear the burden of proving the waiver. But even when the use
is reasonable, of course, the seller ought to be compensated for its value,
and one New Mexico case has suggested that the use value is recoverable
97. See Mobile Home Sales Management, Inc. v. Brown, and Minsel v. El Rancho Mobile Home
Center, Inc.
98. 97 N.M. at 416, 640 P.2d at 522.
99. See Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 382 A.2d 954 (Ch. Div. 1978), overruled
on other grounds, Ramirez v. AutoSport, 88 N.J. 277, 440 A.2d 1345 (1982).
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by the seller as an offset to the successful buyer's award.' 00 Unfortunately
for the Hatches, they failed to ask for the offset.
Finally, the court's unwillingness to set boundaries on the extent or
duration of the use as a matter of law is well-founded. A finding that the
buyer's acts are "inconsistent with the seller's ownership" and thus con-
stitute acceptance requires essentially a determination that the acts are
"inconsistent with his [or her] claim that he for she] has rejected the
goods."' 1 What is important is whether the buyer has in fact changed
her mind and decided to keep the goods instead of returning them, and
for that investigation no one set of facts should be legally determinative.
Like the resolution of a somewhat similar issue, what constitutes a "rea-
sonable time" under the Code, the buyer's intentions in using goods can
only surface in a thorough examination of "the nature, purpose and
circumstances" 102 of the use.
D. Insurance
One important case involving a contract of insurance has been discussed
above. 0 3 Four others deserve a brief mention.
In Guess v. Gulf Insurance Co., 0 on an issue of first impression, the
supreme court held that an insured can institute a direct action against
an insurer for uninsured motorist benefits. The court rejected the insurer's
position that a prior action and judgment against the uninsured motorist
is a prerequisite to an action against the insurer. Lest anyone miss the
point, in Wood v. Millers National Insurance Co., 05 the court delivered
an identical holding on a substantially identical policy less than four
months later, repeating the entire analysis and inexplicably failing to
mention the earlier case. The court twice held that neither state law
requiring insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage"06 nor the policy
itself required a prior action against the motorist. Both policies contained
the thoroughly typical clause providing that the insurer would not be
bound by a judgment against the tortfeasor unless the action had been
prosecuted with the written consent of the company. Not only does the
clause not expressly require a prior suit, the court concluded, "[tihere
would be no reason to require the insured to first sue the tortfeasor and
100. Gawlich v. American Builders Supply, Inc., 86 N.M. 77, 519 P.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1974).
101. U.C.C. § 2-606, official comment 4 (1978).
102. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-1-204(2) (1978).
103. Stock v. ADCO General Corp., 96 N.M. 544, 632 P.2d 1182 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied,
96 N.M. 543, 632 P.2d 1181 (1981), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 41-58.
104. 96 N.M. 27, 627 P.2d 869 (1981).
105. 96 N.M. 525, 632 P.2d 1163 (1981).
106. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5-301(A) (1978).
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recover a judgment since the insurance company is not bound by the
judgment under the terms of the policy."°7
In People's State Bank v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 108 the supreme
court reversed a summary judgment for the insurer because the alleged
waiver of the time-to-sue limitation of the policy presented a substantial
issue of fact. The policy barred suit after one year from the date of loss
and the plaintiff missed the deadline by four months. During that year,
however, the insurer's initial denial of coverage was followed by three
settlement offers from Ohio's agent, the last of which expired five days
after expiration of the time-to-sue limitation. The court concluded that
the facts presented two substantial issues making the case inappropriate
for summary judgment: (1) whether the agent had authority to waive the
time-to-sue provisions, and (2) whether the negotiations had in fact waived
the provision. Although "[n]egotiations alone are insufficient to support
a finding of waiver if the negotiations are terminated within adequate
time for the insured to institute an action on the policy," 109 here the final
offer expired after the time limitation. Despite the insurer's argument that
the letter containing the final offer also specified that Ohio waived no
rights under the policy and thus removed any doubt on the issue of waiver,
the court held that the jury could draw a reasonable inference in favor
of the insured that the offer "would lull the insured into reasonably
believing that its claim would be settled without suit. .. .
Finally, Hartman v. Shambaughl" clarified recovery under a policy of
title insurance when title to a portion of the insured property fails. The
measure of damages should be determined by actual value rather than
purchase price. Further where, as with urban property, the value of an
entire tract of land is diminished by failure of title to a portion of it, "the
proper measure of damages requires consideration of impairment of the
value to the entire lot."' 1 2 The court held that the impairment is to be
measured at the time the defect is discovered rather than at the time of
purchase. "'
II. BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Although the Survey year was relatively quiet in this area, there were
four decisions which broke no new ground but of which the practitioner
107. 96 N.M. at 29, 629 P.2d at 871.
108. 96 N.M. 751, 635 P.2d 306 (1981).
109. Id. at 753, 635 P.2d at 308.
110. Id.
111. 96 N.M. 359, 630 P.2d 758 (1981). For further discussion of this case, see Minzner, Property,
post at 435, and Note, Title Insurance-New Mexico Sets the Date for Determination of Value in
Title Insurance Cases: Hartman v. Shambaugh, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 833 (1982).
112. 96 N.M. at 362, 630 P.2d at 761.
113. Id. at 364, 630 P.2d at 763.
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ought to be aware. Ulibarri Landscaping Material, Inc. v. Colony Ma-
terials, Inc."I4 dealt with the master-servant relationship; Citizens Bank
of Clovis v. Williams"5 and Evans Products Co. v. O'Dell..6 with part-
nerships; and Cruttenden v. Mantura"7 with corporations.
In Ulibarri, the court of appeals held that an employer is liable for
negligent conversion by its employee when, even though without knowl-
edge of the conversion, the employer accepts the benefits of the tortious
acts. The defendant instructed its employee to dig and remove scoria
from a community pit. In doing so, the employee also removed some
$40,000 worth of the material which had been stockpiled by and belonged
to the plaintiff. The defendant accepted and used the plaintiff's material,
but there was no evidence that it knew of the conversion. Nevertheless,
the court held that the defendant's "acceptance of the converted material
was a sufficient ratification of [its employee's] action to subject it to
liablity to the plaintiff."" 8 That result seems so fair (because defendant
otherwise would have received a tremendous windfall at the plaintiff's
expense) that it is a wonder that the issue was even litigated. Indeed, the
employer's liability for its overzealous employee's conversion or trespass
within the scope of employment, even absent any retention of benefits
or ratification, is a well-established part of the principle of respondeat
superior. "'9
In Citizens Bank of Clovis, 12o the issue was the applicability of the
statute of frauds to an oral agreement dissolving a partnership and dividing
partnership assets which included real property. The trial court found that
the oral agreement provided for an equal distribution of partnership assets,
including land which had been purchased and contributed to the part-
nership by one partner, Spencer, who died prior to the commencement
of the action. The plaintiff, as Spencer's personal representative, argued
that because the land was part of Spencer's capital contribution to the
partnership (which in absence of agreement would have been returned to
Spencer upon dissolution)' 2 ' the oral agreement constituted the transfer
of Spencer's interest in the land in violation of the statute of frauds.
Consequently, the plaintiff concluded, the oral agreement was unenforce-
able and the land belonged to Spencer's estate.
The supreme court disagreed, noting first that partnerships are generally
114. 97 N.M. 266, 639 P.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, - N.M. __ 644 P.2d 1039
(1982).
115. 96 N.M. 373, 630 P.2d 1228 (1981).
116. 96 N.M. 500, 632 P.2d 735 (1981).
117. 97 N.M. 432, 640 P.2d 932 (1982).
118. 97 N.M. at 270, 639 P.2d at 79.
119. Restatement (Second) of Agency §244 (1958).
120. 96 N.M. 373, 630 P.2d 1228 (1981).
121. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 54-1-18(A) (1978).
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permitted to carry on business informally;'22 even the agreement initially
creating the partnership need not be written.'23 Moreover, the court pointed
out, the "interest of a partner in the partnership is personal property and
not real property, even if land is one of the assets. . . 1 24 The dissolution
agreement thus concerned the transfer only of personal property and the
statute of frauds was inapplicable.
The designation of partnership property as personalty in the Uniform
Partnership Act 125 was apparently intended to deal with certain problems
in the administration of a deceased partner's estate 26 rather than to cir-
cumvent the statute of frauds. The court's use of the concept, however,
is a straightforward application of the clear language of the Act and has
the additional advantage of retaining the characteristic informality of the
partnership.
Evans Products'27 and Cruttenden'28 both involved unsuccessful at-
tempts to pierce the insulation provided by the formal business organi-
zations of the limited partnership in the former, and the corporation in
the latter. The plaintiff in Evans Products sought to recover against a
limited partner for a debt owed by the insolvent limited partnership.
Unlike a general partner, a limited partner is not personally liable for
partnership debts unless she takes part in the control of the business. 29
The plaintiff argued that the requisite control could be found in the de-
fendant's participation as a general partner in a related partnership which,
although ostensibly separate from the limited partnership, was in reality
merely a division of it. The defendant's position of control in the sub-
sidiary, the plaintiff concluded, implicated the defendant in the control
of the insolvent parent, and thus rendered him liable for its debts despite
his limited partner status in the parent.
On appeal, the supreme court upheld the lower court's refusal to pierce
the veil of the limited partnership. The court concluded that the finding
that the two partnerships were separate and distinct was supported by
substantial evidence: (1) although the two principals were the same in
both partnerships, they intended to form two separate entities, (2) one
partnership contained an additional member, (3) the businesses were main-
tained at separate locations, (4) the Certificate of Limited Partnership
forbade participation in the kind of business in which the general part-
nership was engaged, (5) the businesses maintained separate bank fi-
122. 96 N.M. at 375-76, 630 P.2d at 1230-31.
123. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §54-1-7 (1978).
124. 96 N.M. at 375, 630 P.2d at 1230 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 54-1-26 (1978)).
125. N.M. Stat. Ann. §54-1-26 (1978).
126. See, e.g., Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1107 (1961 & 79-82 Supp. 1979).
127. 96 N.M. 500, 632 P.2d 735 (1981).
128. 97 N.M. 432, 640 P.2d 932 (1982).
129. N.M. Stat. Ann. §54-2-7 (1978).
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nancing and accounts, and (6) the assets of the businesses were not
commingled. This evidence typifies the traditional characteristics thought
important to a determination of entity insulaticn. The court's holding is
clearly correct.
Like Evans Products, Cruttenden was decided on the issue of sub-
stantial evidence and is thus less important for its precedential value than
for its instructions to litigants on what sort of facts they ought to be trying
to prove to either sustain or shred the corporate veil. Here the plaintiff
attempted to have a parent corporation garnish the wages of an employee
of its wholly-owned subsidiary. The trial court ordered the garnishment
but the supreme court reversed for lack of substantial evidence that the
subsidiary maintained no "independent" existence but was merely the
"alter ego" or "instrumentality" of the parent."'3 Without such evidence,
the court concluded, "service on the parent corporation does not subject
the subsidiary corporation to local jurisdiction.""'
The only evidence in the record of the relationship of the two corpo-
rations was that one was in fact a subsidiary of the other and that certain
of the parent's contracts had been assigned to the subsidiary. That is not
enough, the court properly held, since without more, a "subsidiary and
its parent corporation are viewed as independent corporations."' 32 Some-
what gratuitously in light of the paucity of the plaintiff's evidence, the
court did set out ten factors for guidance in the determination of whether
a subsidiary is a mere "alter ego" of its parent.'33 The plaintiff satisfied
none of them, of course, but should you be contemplating trying to get
to a parent through its subsidiary, I commend them to your attention.
130. 97 N.M. at 434, 640 P.2d at 934.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 434-35, 640 P.2d at 934-35.
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